If the original problem is so complex that you cannot come up with an immediate solution, try to identify a simplified version of the problem and start with it. Usually, you can start with the simplest problem and gradually increase the complexity. You do not need to have a defined plan at the beginning. Just try to solve the simplest cases and analyze your reasoning. More often than not, you will find a pattern that will guide you through the whole problem.
Besides starting with a simplified version of the problem, we can also split the problem into two or more mutually exclusive cases and solve each individual case independently. This approach is called casework (as we have seen in the Counting chapter).
Problem 4‑31
Screwy pirates: Five pirates looted a chest full of 100 gold coins. Being a bunch of democratic pirates, they agree on the following method to divide the loot:
The most senior pirate will propose a distribution of the coins. All pirates, including the most senior pirate, will then vote. If at least 50% of the pirates (3 pirates in this case) accept the proposal, the gold is divided as proposed. If not, the most senior pirate will be fed to a shark, and the process starts over with the next most senior pirate… The process is repeated until a plan is approved. You can assume that all pirates are perfectly rational; they want to stay alive first and to get as much gold as possible, second. Finally, being blood-thirsty pirates, they want to have fewer pirates on the boat if given a choice between otherwise equal outcomes.
How will the gold coins be divided in the end?
Solution: Chances are that you have not studied game theory, and this strategy problem may appear to be daunting. If the problem with 5 pirates seems complex, we can always start with a simplified version of the problem by reducing the number of pirates. Since the solution to 1‑pirate case is trivial, let’s start with 2 pirates. The senior pirate (labeled as 2) can claim all the gold since he will always get 50% of the votes from himself, and pirate 1 is left with nothing.
Let’s add a more senior pirate, 3. He knows that if his plan is voted down, pirate 1 will get nothing. But if he offers pirate 1 nothing, pirate 1 will be happy to kill him. Therefore, pirate 3 will offer pirate 1 one coin and keep the remaining 99 coins, so the plan will have 2 votes from pirates 1 and 3.
If pirate 4 is added, he knows that if his plan is voted down, pirate 2 will get nothing. Thus, pirate 2 will settle for one coin if pirate 4 offers one. Therefore, pirate 4 should offer pirate 2 one coin and keep the remaining 99 coins, and his plan will be approved with 50% of the votes from pirate 2 and 4.
Now we finally come to the 5-pirate case. He knows that if his plan is voted down, both pirate 3 and pirate 1 will get nothing. Therefore, he only needs to offer pirate 1 and pirate 3 one coin each to get their votes and keep the remaining 98 coins. If he divides the coins this way, he will have three out of the five votes: from pirates 1 and 3 as well as himself.
Once we start with a
simplified version and add complexity to it, the answer becomes obvious. After
the case of , a clear pattern has
emerged, and we do not need to stop at 5 pirates. For any
pirate case (n
should be less than 99 though), the most senior pirate will offer pirates
and
each one coin and keep
the rest for himself.
Problem 4‑32
Solution: 100 is a large number, so again let’s start
with a simplified version of the problem. If there is only 1
tiger (), surely it will eat
the sheep since it does not need to worry about being eaten. How about 2
tigers? Since both tigers are perfectly rational, either tiger will do some
thinking as to what will happen if it eats the sheep. Either tiger is probably
thinking: if I eat the sheep, I will become a sheep. Then I will be eaten by
the other tiger. To guarantee the highest likelihood of survival, neither tiger
will eat the sheep.
If there are 3 tigers, the sheep will be eaten since each tiger will realize that once it changes to a sheep, there will be 2 tigers left, and it will not be eaten. Thus, the first tiger that thinks this through will eat the sheep. If there are 4 tigers, each tiger will understand that if it eats the sheep, it will turn to a sheep. Since there are 3 other tigers, it will be eaten. To guarantee the highest likelihood of survival, no tiger will eat the sheep.
Following the same logic, we can naturally show that if the
number of tigers is even, the sheep will not be eaten. If the number is odd,
the sheep will be eaten. For the case , the sheep will not be
eaten.
Problem 4‑33
They are given the night to come up with a strategy among themselves to save as many prisoners as possible. What is the best strategy they can adopt, and how many prisoners can they guarantee to free?[24]
Part B. What if there are 3 possible hat colors: red, blue, and white? What is the best strategy they can adopt, and how many prisoners can they guarantee to free?[25]
The two-color case is easy,
isn’t it? Now let’s consider the 3-color case. Despite the additional
complexity, the answer is still that at least 99 prisoners will be freed. The
difference is that the first prisoner now only has a 1/3 chance of freedom.
Let’s use the following scoring system: red=0, green=1, and blue=2. The first
prisoner counts the total score (s) for the rest of 99 prisoners and
calculates . If the remainder is 0,
he announces red; if the remainder is 1, green; 2, blue. He has 1/3 chance of
being freed, but all the rest of the prisoners can determine their own scores
(colors) from the remainder. Let’s consider a prisoner i among 99
prisoners (excluding the first prisoner). He can calculate the total score (x)
of all the other 98 prisoners. Since
and
are all different, from
the remainder that the first prisoner gives (for the 99 prisoners including i),
he can determine his own score (color). For example, if prisoner i sees
that there are 32 red, 29 green, and 37 blue in those 98 prisoners (excluding
the first and himself). The total score of those 98 prisoners is 103. If the
first prisoner announces that the remainder is 2 (green), then prisoner i
knows his own color is green (1) since only
among 103, 104, and
105.
Theoretically, we can apply a similar strategy to any number of hat colors. Surely, that requires all prisoners to have exceptional memory and calculation capability.
[24] Hint: The first prisoner can see the number of red and blue hats of all other 99 prisoners. One color will have an odd number of counts and the other has even number of counts.
[25] Hint: That a number is odd
simply means . Here we have 3 colors,
so you may want to consider
instead.